There's a recent BBS article about the evolution of peace in humans focusing on the factors required before our species could create peace and speculating when it might have occurred: The evolution of peace. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2024;47:e1. doi:10.1017/S0140525X22002862
Dr Turchin, you may be 'Profesor Doom' to the media class in their bubble who thought everything was fine until very recently; but to those of us in the working classes who can feel everything breaking and want the people running things to do a better job, it's quite the opposite: you actually bring hope.
I especially appreciate the effort you go to to bracket your own politics in order to follow the models and the data wherever they take you. I know that is hard and few academics are willing to do that these days.
It’s interesting the Chalcolithic spike in violence is simultaneous in the Middle East with urbanisation, as the first cities began appearing at Eridu, Uruk, and Tell Brak. Do you think the increased violence was either a cause of or a driver of urbanisation?
As I argue in my book Ultrasociety, the first function of cities was protection. So cities and states evolved together under the selection pressure of more intense warfare.
Excellent summary that mentions one of my favorite books: _War Before Civilization _ by Lawrence Keeley. Available at Internet Archives, BTW. The optimistic take is welcome, but what about nuclear weapons? They might make the current cycle our last. I sincerely hope not. But remember that we got very lucky during the Cold War. The US and the Soviet Union arrived at a relatively stable understanding. What will happen as nukes (probably) proliferate during the 21st century?
20 to 25% of probability to die of (human related) violent death in hunters-gathers societies (but as you said, it might vary a lot depending on the period), something like 5% during the Roman Empire, more than 10% during medieval times with a trend toward less than 1 or 2% in European modern states (despite the 2 world wars !).
Which tend to illustrate how much we are actually sheltered from violence in our societies. And how much we have to loose.
I don't think there is much reliable empirical support for this claim: "Additionally, we know that most humans are averse to violence, and it takes training and combat experience to turn them into killers." The data from SLA Marshall are notoriously unreliable, likely little more than made up. Perhaps more importantly, there's a huge discontinuity between state level war and the small scale violence in band and tribal societies.
What I have observed is that external wars (and large internal wars) tend to occur clusters. Often one war further destabilizes the area leading other wars. Some examples.
Dissolution of the Soviet Union (Itself partially caused by the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan)
Chechen Wars
Civil Wars in a number of Central Asia states.
Nargorno-Karabakh Wars
Soviet invasion of Georgia
Soviet Invasion of Ukraine (main cause of the recent increase in war deaths)
Collapse of the Qing Dynasty
Opium Wars
Taiping Rebellion
1st Sino-Japanese War
Russo-Japanese War
Great Plains War
Northern Expedition
2nd Sino-Japanese War
Pacific War
Chinese Civil War
Korean War
Vietnam War
Ussuri River Incident
Overthrow of Khmer Rouge
Sino-Vietnamese War
Note the abrupt end of interstate conflict in East Asia in 1979
The relationship between intrastate and interstate warfare is interesting here. In the case of intrastate warfare the ratio of perimeter to area is presumably moot, so large empires will have much more to lose in civil war than external warfare so long as external warfare can be contained to peripheral areas (debatable under some modern contexts, but still seems to hold up under others). This creates an interesting potential dynamic: save lives and institutional stability by deliberately externalizing violence. Pursue external warfare as policy to prevent civil war from breaking out. This is one thesis that Zeihan has explicitly put forward as an option / risk for China in the coming decade. China is surely not alone here.
It's unfortunate that the history of warfare begins in 1946, after the most violent decades of war in possibly centuries. The omission doesn't alter the point being made and it does highlight the civil wars in Asia in the 1940s, but still, for us Eurocentric types, seems a big omission.
There's a recent BBS article about the evolution of peace in humans focusing on the factors required before our species could create peace and speculating when it might have occurred: The evolution of peace. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2024;47:e1. doi:10.1017/S0140525X22002862
Dr Turchin, you may be 'Profesor Doom' to the media class in their bubble who thought everything was fine until very recently; but to those of us in the working classes who can feel everything breaking and want the people running things to do a better job, it's quite the opposite: you actually bring hope.
I especially appreciate the effort you go to to bracket your own politics in order to follow the models and the data wherever they take you. I know that is hard and few academics are willing to do that these days.
Thank you!
It’s interesting the Chalcolithic spike in violence is simultaneous in the Middle East with urbanisation, as the first cities began appearing at Eridu, Uruk, and Tell Brak. Do you think the increased violence was either a cause of or a driver of urbanisation?
As I argue in my book Ultrasociety, the first function of cities was protection. So cities and states evolved together under the selection pressure of more intense warfare.
I shall go buy the book!
Excellent summary that mentions one of my favorite books: _War Before Civilization _ by Lawrence Keeley. Available at Internet Archives, BTW. The optimistic take is welcome, but what about nuclear weapons? They might make the current cycle our last. I sincerely hope not. But remember that we got very lucky during the Cold War. The US and the Soviet Union arrived at a relatively stable understanding. What will happen as nukes (probably) proliferate during the 21st century?
I kept in mind something roughly like that :
20 to 25% of probability to die of (human related) violent death in hunters-gathers societies (but as you said, it might vary a lot depending on the period), something like 5% during the Roman Empire, more than 10% during medieval times with a trend toward less than 1 or 2% in European modern states (despite the 2 world wars !).
Which tend to illustrate how much we are actually sheltered from violence in our societies. And how much we have to loose.
I wonder where the tribute came from?
I don't think there is much reliable empirical support for this claim: "Additionally, we know that most humans are averse to violence, and it takes training and combat experience to turn them into killers." The data from SLA Marshall are notoriously unreliable, likely little more than made up. Perhaps more importantly, there's a huge discontinuity between state level war and the small scale violence in band and tribal societies.
What I have observed is that external wars (and large internal wars) tend to occur clusters. Often one war further destabilizes the area leading other wars. Some examples.
Dissolution of the Soviet Union (Itself partially caused by the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan)
Chechen Wars
Civil Wars in a number of Central Asia states.
Nargorno-Karabakh Wars
Soviet invasion of Georgia
Soviet Invasion of Ukraine (main cause of the recent increase in war deaths)
Collapse of the Qing Dynasty
Opium Wars
Taiping Rebellion
1st Sino-Japanese War
Russo-Japanese War
Great Plains War
Northern Expedition
2nd Sino-Japanese War
Pacific War
Chinese Civil War
Korean War
Vietnam War
Ussuri River Incident
Overthrow of Khmer Rouge
Sino-Vietnamese War
Note the abrupt end of interstate conflict in East Asia in 1979
Good observation. There is only one note here: "Soviet invasion of Georgia
Soviet Invasion of Ukraine (main cause of the recent increase in war deaths)" :-)
What kind of soviet invasions after dissolution of the Soviet Union?
The relationship between intrastate and interstate warfare is interesting here. In the case of intrastate warfare the ratio of perimeter to area is presumably moot, so large empires will have much more to lose in civil war than external warfare so long as external warfare can be contained to peripheral areas (debatable under some modern contexts, but still seems to hold up under others). This creates an interesting potential dynamic: save lives and institutional stability by deliberately externalizing violence. Pursue external warfare as policy to prevent civil war from breaking out. This is one thesis that Zeihan has explicitly put forward as an option / risk for China in the coming decade. China is surely not alone here.
“The small proportion who were intrinsically capable of lethal violence (e.g., sociopaths)” -
Are you sure this is a valid bedrock assumption about humanity then or now? I am not.
It's unfortunate that the history of warfare begins in 1946, after the most violent decades of war in possibly centuries. The omission doesn't alter the point being made and it does highlight the civil wars in Asia in the 1940s, but still, for us Eurocentric types, seems a big omission.
Assuming our latest military revolution (nuclear weapons) continue to be tightly controlled by governments interested in self-preservation.
What I find weird is school shootings in America
It’s not a thing in other countries
And it’s always young white males
Shooting children
It’s bizarre
https://peterturchin.com/canaries-in-a-coal-mine/
Well nice to have some happy talk
I feel Pinker is a propagandist
Selects the data that suits his argument ignores the rest
Just my humble opinion
Everything is wonderful when your part of a team is his positivism thesis
So guess he is a positivist
Thought that philosophy had died off
This too shall pass... FROM YOUR MOUTH TO GOD'S EAR!