Professor Turchin, your analysis of the logistics and Asabiya is structurally brilliant. From a geopolitical perspective, I agree with every point.
However, you are assuming that the target of Operation Epic Fury is Tehran when in reality it's Washington.
You view the logistical exhaustion of PAC-3 Patriot missiles as a strategic miscalculation by the US. If we look closer at the procurement shift, it becomes clear that the exhaustion of legacy munitions is in fact a forced product deprecation. It is the forcing function required to pivot the Pentagon entirely onto the attritable, AI-driven drone swarms built by Anduril and controlled with Palantir.
Where Lockheed and Raytheon sold inventory, the new Tech Lords sell software subscriptions like Palantir's Gotham and Anduril's Lattice. A SaaS business model collapses without an active user base. In defense tech, this means you need a manageable forever-war. Total victory and total defeat both lead to customer churn. To maximize shareholder value and justify the recurring revenue of the AI kill-chain, the Lords are financially incentivized to keep the geopolitical temperature perpetually in the Red Zone.
Furthermore, you note that external attacks forge internal Asabiya and suppress internal divisions.
The American Regime knows this. Facing a catastrophic demographic and electoral rejection in the upcoming November 2026 Midterms, the ruling coalition requires a State of Exception to justify the suspension of domestic norms, the deployment of internal security forces, and the activation of the FASAB 56 Black Budget.
I think you assume too much intelligence for Trump regime. In reality we have a fight between three obsessively messianic kleptocratic gangs of which the one ruling the US is the dumbest and the most corrupt. Even if they are dreaming of drone swarms sufficient for taking over from missiles (which might not be possible at all), they clearly aren't going to have them by March 23 (I've seen even earlier estimates for when the missiles will run out). Their only hope is to take out all Iranian launch capacity before that date. It makes no sense for Iran to keep missiles in storage and risk losing them, so I'd expect them to launch everything they have in the first few days. But, of course, they can also be expected to be too dumb to behave rationally - otherwise they wouldn't be in this situation in the first place.
Vladimir, this is not a "Trump regime". This is a Peter Thiel regime. Trump is just a second-rate TV show host acting as the face of the operation and distracting the masses from the men behind the curtain. The real controls have been captured by the Authoritarian Stack the moment cabinet appointments were announced.
Thiel, Miller, Hegseth, Icahn, Vought, Musk, Kennedy - all of them are even dumber than Trump, but more deranged and fanatical. They are the messianic gang I am talking about. Have you seen the recent news about Hegseth pushing Fundamentalist Evangelical propaganda in the military? Trump at least has good survival instinct. But you have to be a very special kind of stupid to be a billionaire and try to intentionally destroy the very country you are exploiting.
And if you need a personal name for this regime and don't like "Trump regime", I'd call it Putin regime. Being a Russia fan is clearly a pre-requisite for getting a cabinet position, and mimicking all things Putin is the fashion. They are essentially calling the war with Iran a "Special Military Operation" already.
Vladimir, you are making the classic error of looking at the Marketing Department and assuming they run the Engineering Department.
You see Hegseth pushing Evangelical propaganda and assume the Regime is a Christian fundamentalist cult. Look at the architecture, not the aesthetic. Humans require ideological software to function in a high-friction environment. While the Tech Lords wait for Anduril’s autonomous swarms and Hadrian's automated factories to fully scale, they still need bio-troops who will follow orders without question. Christian Nationalism is simply the most efficient compliance algorithm available for the current demographic of the enlisted class. Thiel and Musk are not Evangelicals; they are Transhumanists temporarily leasing an Evangelical militia.
As for your assertion that they are "destroying the country they exploit," you misunderstand their objective function. They do not view the United States as a nation to be governed but as a distressed asset to be liquidated. They are stripping the copper wire out of the Old Republic to build the data centers and orbital grids of the New Empire.
Finally, the fact that this mirrors Putin is not cosplay or fandom. It is Convergent Evolution. When a ruling class needs to bypass the legislature, secure emergency off-book funding (FASAB 56), and silence domestic opposition (NSPM-7), the physics of authoritarianism dictate they use the exact same legal and semantic loopholes. They are trying to do in 2 years what took Putin 20. Instrumental convergence is imminent.
I think you are making the classic error of assuming that there is a brain behind the chaos. There is not. I am not saying the ruling gang is all made of Christian Nationalists. It's fairly diverse and each one has his own brain worms. I think racism is the only thing they all share and even that is mostly a coincidence. And they are not destroying the US to build something better - they are just trying to make a quick buck while they can.
Yes, you are correct that they all share Putin's goals of replacing free market with crony capitalism and democracy with feudal kleptocracy. But their extreme loyalty to Russia at any cost can't be explained just by that.
It's only natural that you don't believe me. Some of these things are genuinely hard to believe. Instead of trying to persuade you, I will just say this: Read the Epstein files. Not the news reports about them; not citations; not screenshots; the actual files. Pay special attention to the files that mention Palantir, Martin Nowak, and Cantor Fitzgerald. These people are way smarter than you think.
I too have followed the "dissident American security experts" during the Ukraine war, when they forecasted an imminent defeat of Ukraine for the last three years.
I found their arguments convincing.
Nevertheless, by now I have to admit that they have been wrong. Not only is Ukraine not defeated, it seems to be moving forward recently.
Given this track record, I will no longer heed the arguments of said dissident American security experts.
I cannot help but be impressed by the USA/Israel alliance's ability to decapitate the regime so quickly and so spectacularly. So far this war has been well planned. If I had to bet, I'd put my money on USA/Israel.
You are entitled to your opinion, but they (at least the three I mentioned) haven't been saying "imminent" (in the sense, next month), but "inevitable". And I tend to agree with them. Ukraine is not moving forward, there are just minor back and forth fluctuations (and a lot of hype). We wait and see.
I have listened to him since the beginning of the Ukraine war. Since 2023, he has been saying that Ukraine has already been defeated. For example, in this https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMUAaWK79Vc, he and Carlson agreed that it was 'already over' for Ukraine 2.5 years ago.
Go through his podcasts over the years (using summaries), and you will find that in his mind Russia should be in Kiev at least since 2024.
Yes, a war can last a long time even if it is already lost, but in my opinion, too much time has passed for his forecasts to be correct. By now, there is no clear evidence to show that Ukraine is even losing.
I am grateful for his comments since they provide an alternative perspective, but I am now convinced that he is very one-sided—just as Carlson, Ritter etc. are. They have their fixed opinions (Ukraine bad, Israel very bad, Putin good, and now Trump also bad) and frame everything to fit that narrative.
I still listen to him from time to time, but am mindful that he is talking propaganda, just as we can hear from the other side.
I don't think Iran's enemies understand that the concept of martyrdom in the cause of justice is baked into Shi'ah Islam, which the Safavids established in Iran 500 years ago.
So the assumption that decapitating the regime undermines asabiya simply does not apply there.
I am not saying whether this is good or bad – simply pointing it out.
Yes, I also here from several credible sources that martyrdom and suffering is a characteristic Shia find admirable. But it's a more general proposal -- you put any group of people under a press long enough, and they will develop asabiya. A literary example is the Fremen in Dune. And the Sardaukar.
Yes, killing the leaders might indeed improve asabiya, especially in the Shiia strong martyrdom tradition.
But, on the other hand, it's also a way of making attrition very personal, because it means killing them one by one until one of them doesn't want to die and agrees to negotiate and/or surrender.
There is more to war than logistics. The US has outperforming the Iranians at the operational level.
Surprisingly, Trump actually listened to General Caine and delayed the attack until the US had moved more forces into the region(USS Gerald Ford) to both launch attacks and defend bases. And the US has decades of experience in fighting modern wars.
The Iranians seem to be attacking a pre-designated list of targets without regards the principle of concentration of force. In the Ukraine, both sides conduct focused barrages to overwhelm air defenses, but the Iranians have scattered their attacks doing little damage. They even pointlessly attacked the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, which was not even be used.
The Iranians also neglected basic operational security. Putin rarely meets with anyone in person and has identical offices so you can't figure out where he is. Saddam Hussein used to sleep at a different location every night. Instead the Iranians scheduled a mass in-person meeting of all their top people.
Logistical limitations will eventually slow the US attacks but new ordnance is made continously. Iranian missile and drone manufacturing facilities are vulnerable to US attack and they have no outside source of supply (the Russians were buying from them).
The US problem is that winning operationally does not change the fundamental situation. The current regime will remain in control and will continue to cause problems.
I initially was going to disagree with you, but in the end you've argued yourself to my side. But the important point is that in the final analysis, logistics trumps operations.
Sometimes, operations trumps logistics. Remember France in 1940. If you are conquered, your opponents logistics problems become irrelevant.
However, there is a logic to US policy here. It seeks to deal with a hostile state through active deterence, damaging its military capabilities without conquest.
This is something new. In the 20th century, air attacks usually involved flying planes over enemy territory and bombing the enemy. However, missiles and drones have largely replaced bombs, so warfare can be conducted at a distance. If your opponent lacks similar capabilities, you can attack with impunity. The Iranians had some capability to fight at a distance, but they wasted it with poor planning.
Using your military to harm but not conquer is reminiscint of ancient empires. The Romans found Germania to hard and unprobitable to conquer, but they conducted punitive expeditions against hostile tribes. Similar behaviour occured with other empires.
Another precedent were efforts to deal with the Barbary pirates through retaliation. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Barbary_War). These failed because the pirates were semi-independent actors whose livelihood depended on piracy and were willing to ignore the damage inflicted. Piracy was only stopped by conquest.
It remains to be seen whether damage without conquest will be a successful doctrine.
Your example of the Roman frontier with Germania is quite appropriate. I discuss it at length in War and Peace and War. And what was the outcome? The Germans conquered the western parts of the Roman empire. A lesson here for the American empire, n'est-ce pas?
The primary conflict Iran is heading into will not be about the West; it will be purely internal, as has happened before in Iranian history. This will be a struggle between those who support a theocratic state and those who want a secular country.
In Russia, as well as in other countries, some experts predict that since the US failed to topple the regime in two days, they have now ended up with their own "Ukraine," and this war is here to stay.
This is a rather naive outlook on the part of these experts—a failure to understand that no two wars are the same and that this war will not be like the one in Ukraine.
First, Iran is not a massive Russia. Most importantly, it stands alone and is now closed off; it is surrounded mostly by enemies or those who are indifferent but under US control. It lacks a massive rear like Ukraine has in the West, as well as a shared OPEN BORDER with such a rear. This means that even if China, for example, wanted to become that rear for Iran, it would find it very, very difficult to establish a major supply channel for equipment and ammunition.
Second, the people in Iran did not unite after the war began. Unlike in Ukraine, the local authorities, who have been in power for decades, have managed to alienate a very large portion of the citizenry. A majority of Iranians are currently rooting for the US military rather than the Iranian army.
Third, this is a completely different war strategy with different goals because the internal situation in Iran differs greatly from that in Ukraine. There is no objective here to shift into a war of attrition to reprogram the Iranian people through it; almost everyone who could be reprogrammed there has been already, and for that, we can thank the theistic government in Iran itself.
Therefore, different methods of warfare will be employed—specifically, a focus on the constant elimination of the top leadership.
Then there is all this talk about how the Iranian leadership defragmented its power precisely so that everything would not depend on just one or two people at the top, turning it into autonomous cells that make decisions on their own. This is, of course, a good and successful strategy that guarantees the regime will still put up resistance even after a leader dies.
However, the problem with this strategy is that it cannot exist successfully for long in the long run without the fragmentation of the country itself.
Autonomous cells are good for guerrilla warfare or a terrorist underground, but they cannot manage a state, an economy, or a complex air defense system.
In other words, these intentionally fragmented parts will, over time—and quite quickly—stop acting as a single entity, which is perfectly natural for such a structure in this situation.
This planned and temporary strategy of power fragmentation is successful in a very short war, because afterward, the real fragmentation of power and the country begins, and these fragmented pieces stop fighting as a unified whole.
As soon as the central vertical disappears, "autonomous commanders" turn into warlords. They begin to compete for resources, which leads to feudalization and the collapse of the country from within, rather than to organized resistance against an aggressor.
If the Russians in Ukraine had adhered to the same strategy that the Americans are building now, the war would have been completely different. After all, the Kremlin has real means to eliminate the top leadership in Ukraine.
If, for example, they had eliminated Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi back in the day, who would have taken power in Ukraine? Poroshenko or perhaps Budanov? But they would not have had such a rating or such support, and this would have directly affected the stability of the vertical of power and the execution of decisions throughout its length. And then, if the new top leadership in the form of the new government—say, that same Poroshenko—were eliminated, power would pass to an even less popular person, further breaking the vertical of power and fragmenting it along with the country. And so on—again, the elimination of the top leadership and the arrival of even more unpopular people, meaning even greater destruction of central power and fragmentation of the country, and then its collapse as a unified state.
This is exactly how the US and Israel will act now: as soon as Iran chooses a new leader—and it must choose one, as their fragmented power management cannot function successfully as a single entity for long. Furthermore, Iran cannot do this in secret; a leader must be presented to the country, and everyone must know who the new leader is. And as soon as they announce a new leader, they are essentially drawing a cross on his forehead; the hunt for him will begin immediately. Given the military and technological capabilities of the US and Israel, and the fact that most of the Iranian people are rooting against their own government, the chances of a new leader staying alive for long after his election are very slim.
To become the new leader of Iran now is, in essence, to sign your own death warrant. The moment you become the leader—that’s it; the hunt is immediately on for you, and you become the number one target in a hunt where the hunters have vast capabilities.
So Iran will not be able, like Ukraine, to provide resistance for years centrally and through a strong vertical of all power.
In Iran, because of a different strategic vision of the war, the US and Israel will help the Iranian government fragment so quickly (compared to the war in Ukraine) that it will no longer be able to resist as a single entity, and the conflict will begin to shift more into an internal and smoldering one.
The big war will be over, and the central power will fall, but there will be no peace in Iran; the Iranians themselves will still have to fight internally to finally destroy the theistic power on the ground and become a peaceful and unified secular society again.
So for Trump, the main thing is to say that the primary goal is simply the fall of the regime, and after that, the Iranians will fight within the country themselves for a peaceful and prosperous secular society. Then he will secure a victory and not fall into the trap of a long conflict that won't be resolved by a quick transition of Iran to a new, peaceful secular life.
Yes. I tend to agree with the essence of your analysis here.
Most "experts" underestimate the impact of technology updates over the past decades, including recent AI and sensor updates, on the US military's operational tempo.
Operational Tempo drives faster kill chains.
Faster Kills chains drive a new kind of decapitation / C2 disruption warfare that we have never seen before.
Simply repeating "air wars don't work" blinds us to the nuances of this situation.
Indeed, what we are seeing is the very essence of OODA-loop and tempo-driven warfare doctrine.
Professor Turchin's assabiya point is well taken, but by his own admission, this takes time, and the US might be able to eliminate new leaders faster than new assabiya can be built and operationalized.
This, of course, does not solve "the problem" of a theocratic Iran, but it does open a window for a greater range of potential outcomes. Which is a net positive in a world where all the default outcomes are bad.
This all reminds me of the Gingko leaf analogy we've seen used before (e.g., Hoyer, Turchin et al 2025). There are points at which too many forces are in play and reliable "patterns of history" lose their predictive power. Many outcomes are possible.
US can do war like this bc they have strong power due to strong asabiya no? But US is in disintegrative phase no? Why the US, Israel or world financial elites r doing war? Like why do they need war. To make inner social unstability pressure go out? In social demographic and elite class point of view.
US is in the disintegrative phase but it still has more Asabiya than other nations of its size.
Geopolitics is a constant regardless of the phase of the secular cycle. For Israel, the war is existential as Iran has commanded and supplied its frontier enemies. For the US, the war is primarily geopolitical. It's possible the US elite, primarily Trump, also have personal motivations, but those are secondary.
Very interesting as always. My two cents: at this stage, I wouldn’t rule out any outcome: it’s still too early to make firm predictions. That said, I wouldn’t exclude the possibility of a partial regime change either. The Iranian elites appear quite fragmented, state legitimacy seems significantly lower than in previous years, and revolts and protests have become both more frequent and more intense, with repression growing correspondingly harsher.
Iran’s population has tripled since the 1970s, while living conditions have generally deteriorated. Youth unemployment has soared to around 50–60% in some areas, with more than 40% of the unemployed holding at least a university degree. Under these conditions, it seems plausible that the religious clergy could eventually be displaced by a military elite — perhaps from the Pasdaran?— which has been somewhat sidelined in recent years. One could imagine a scenario loosely comparable to what happened in Syria with al-Jolani, a former al-Qaeda combatant who rebranded himself as a more moderate and cohesive leader.
I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts on this.
Asabiya is not necessarily a problem for the US or Israel. Neither country is Iran's natural enemy. Israel saw it as an ally from 1948 to 1979. A pro-west regime would confer a significant survival advantage, and can be developed a lot faster than asabiya.
Fascinating analysis, as always. I'm surprised, however, to see no mention of Iran's water crisis brought on by both bad management but also to no small extent, population growth. Isn't structural demographics relevant here? The scenario is similar to what preceded Syria's implosion (I haven't mentioned the role of climate warming). Also, isn't Iraq a parallel experience in terms of American intervention and asabiya? How has that turned out? I haven't heard anything much in the news about the political situation there for ages, only that it, too has a population growth and water shortage problem.
I think Peter Turchin is right, targeted assassinations of leaders is a selection pressure for tougher and more violent leaders.
I am hunting, and hunting in vain for a historical example where assassinating the boss made his successor keen to reach a peaceful deal with the guys who killed him.
Knock off a Julius Caesar and get a Caesar Augustus.
But I can't find either an exemple where leaders were deliberately and efficiently targeted in such a way by a foreign power. With the possible exception of the legendary Hashashin order during the Crusades.
During WW2, the Americans killed Yamamoto but that's about it. And none of the "big boss" were deliberately targeted and/or killed (except by their own people).
// ⛔The sharp fall of a theocracy is rarely painless.⛔
Although I have always rooted for changing the regime in Iran, and now the situation seems good for this, it is already too late for Trump to do this now and help the rebels militarily. This should have been done immediately after the elections, back when Iran was being bombed; that's when the people should have been raised and helped.
But doing it now is much more dangerous - precisely because of democracy and constant elections. Because of this, the president cannot conduct a truly normal foreign, or even domestic policy, because the elections tie his hands, planning horizon, and capabilities. Yet often, unpopular decisions have to be made in order to then get good and useful results.
But because of constant elections, it is extremely difficult for presidents to take unpopular steps - even when they are really needed and will bring many benefits in the future. Electoral cycles are too short for big and historical affairs. The voter feels the negative from unpopular decisions immediately, while the positive often comes after the next electoral cycle.
And that is exactly the situation with Iran now. If Trump starts an Iranian operation, the voter will definitely see the negative. But whether all this will end positively before the midterms this year is a big question. Iran is still not Venezuela. There are few chances that everything can be finished quickly and relatively bloodlessly there. And primarily because in Venezuela the elites, by and large, did not have an idea - there were only interests and money.
But in Iran there is an idea. And not just an idea, but a religious idea, which also promises life after death. This gives people much more courage and readiness for sacrifice. Even if, let's say, the Americans destroy the top of the Iranian regime with a missile, does this guarantee that the protesters will quickly take power? No, not at all. And precisely because of religion.
In a religious society with a great ancient history, where faith was imposed for decades and accompanied by prohibitions, and all this happened already in the era of the internet, naturally a youth formed that is tired of religion and thirsting for freedom. That is, this is a struggle not only for political freedom, but also, in essence, for greater religious freedom, and for some - also for atheistic freedom. That is precisely why during the current protests the rebels are burning mosques (as a symbol of the theocratic regime) and seminaries (spiritual schools).
This is not only a political struggle, but also a religious one. And in a religious war, resistance is always much higher. In Iran, in addition to the protesters, there are many sincerely believing people who are not ready voluntarily and with joy to move from a theocratic state to a secular one. There are many such people - at all levels and in all spheres. And many of them will not accept a secular state without resistance.
History shows that the transition from a theocratic regime to a secular one, especially a quick and revolutionary one, most often ends in a civil war. But in the transition from a secular state to a religious one, the chances of getting by with little blood are greater - non-believers do not offer such fierce resistance as believers. They usually come to active struggle only after long years of religious oppression and fatigue from it.
So even in the case of overthrowing or physically destroying the top of the regime, Iran will with a high degree of probability still have to go through a civil conflict to change the theocracy to a secular state and for society to accept this. Therefore, there are extremely few chances that before the elections Trump will be able to boast of a major success in Iran to voters if he goes in there now. This is the real downside of frequent elections - when the president already after a year is forced to be afraid to make necessary but unpopular decisions.
Regime change in Iran is a necessary thing, even very necessary. But it is unpopular, including among Trump's voters. They, like the rest, will not understand if all this does not end in a quick victory, as in Venezuela, and America again finds itself dragged into a prolonged conflict in the Middle East. Shances to quickly and with little blood conduct the transition from theocratic Iran to secular are extremely few.
Is Iran worth risking the elections? The choice is disproportionate. On one side of the scale is the fate of Iran, on the other is the fate of the whole world. Because Trump changes not only America, he changes the world order. Now it makes more sense to take Greenland - it will be quick and with minimal risk of blood, than to stake everything because of Iran.
Yes, Trump has shown that he is a very lucky person, and largely because of this he is where he is now. But is it worth taking such a risk in an election year when everything is at stake - the future not only of America, but of the whole world? //
I agree that selection pressure should in theory produce high Assabiya leadership. I don’t think that this automatically invalidates US decapitation strategy for the following reasons:
1. The more layers of leadership you remove, the more the future leaders are likely to NOT resemble the current leadership. From the US perspective they are looking for pragmatic leaders they can (at a minimum) do “deals with” and maximally “bring Iran back into the fold of US allies in the Gulf”. You probably have to peel back many layers of the onion before you get there because the existing regime is primarily motivated by theocratic concerns, not practical ones. In a truly ideal world, so much of the theocratic regime is destroyed that the future leadership is drawn from current dissident ranks inside Iran with radically different interests than the current regime. Return of the Shah’s son would be a mistake IMHO.
2. As you note, it might take decades for high Assabiya leadership groups to emerge. The more that process begins with people not in serious power today, the more we are likely to avoid a repeat of the previous two Ayatollahs.
3. On a tactical horizon, eliminating command and control nodes is military doctrine because it is a highly effective way to shorten wars and prevent coherent military responses from enemies. Since day 1 of the campaign the Iranian launch rate has reduced by 88%. This is unprecedented in the history of warfare. It no doubt has many causes, but a leadership layer that is either gone, or (what’s left of it) is unable to speak to other nodes is certainly a major factor: it prevents coordinated, coherent military responses. This reduces the military risks for the US and regional partners and reduces the costs and depletion rates of Patriot / THAAD interceptors, which are the weakest link in terms of being able to politically sustain the campaign. To the extent that all wars are a combination of military and political goals, the military goal is usually defined along the lines of “getting the other military to accept that further resistance is futile”. Trump’s statement to IRGC that if they stop fighting there will be a general clemency was deliberately designed to achieve this in combination with décapitation strikes on senior leaders who would never accept this. As IRGC rank and file are also quite fanatical, it might not work, but it’s not a terrible strategy to at least try (in combination with other approaches for achieving that result). The more total your military victory, the wider your options for effective post war settlement (this is why WW2 HAD to go all the way to Berlin; they learned their lesson from WW1).
4. We already have one extremely high Assabiya group in the region, the Kurds. They are going to seek to carve an autonomous region for themselves and (if they can) a State for themselves. Turkey will try to prevent this of course, so this one is complex, but at a minimum, it gives the US more options for achieving more interesting regime modification options than a simple “swap” of one Ayatollah for another.
5. As noted in “The Dictators’ Handbook” the dictator has a small group of very loyal followers while the democratic leader tends to need to bring more people “along for the ride”. This makes dictatorships extremely stable, but at the cost of very high numbers of internal enemies who must be suppressed at all times for regime survival. (See #4 above, plus the Baluchis, Sunnis etc.) If the inner “hard core” of regime loyalists can be sufficiently weakened by sustained décapitation efforts and peripheral actions by ethnic minorities, then a totally new group can potentially take power in Tehran. Tehran itself is extremely non-theocratic in its orientation and is full of angry young people.
This was seen with (incredibly!) rapid re-integration of Germany into the European Democratic and Economic system after 1945. The “hard core” of true believers was extremely determined but ultimately a minority that could be replaced by other groups within German society rather quickly. “Minor” nazis were rather easily re-assimilated into a system compatible with US postwar goals.
This can yet end with the US achieving many of its objectives, either minimally or maximally.
1. I see your point, but I still think this one is hard to read. Unless the cheering at the death of Khamenei in Tehran was fabricated, it seems that many people in Tehran hated their own leaders more than they hate America. That said, if everyone in any kind of leadership position (even junior) is a committed Shi'a theocrat who hates America, then yes, your assumption of another round of younger fanatical clerics tracks. The only alternative outcome I see is if the Iranian people remove anyone with ties to the current regime, and we get a full (counter) revolutionary regime change. I have no idea whether this is possible. It does seem unlikely right now, so you're probably right on this one. This one is very hard to read from the outside. I have no visibility into the inner workings of Iranian society to predict this.
3. I should clarify: I'm not claiming that Iran has run out of missiles. They almost certainly have not. The most likely conclusion I reach is that they have lost the ability to coordinate their people and systems effectively to select targets, transmit orders, and mount an effective counter-offensive campaign. This looks like an organizational collapse, not a total loss of materiel. There is little doubt that many missiles are hidden away in various places. If this organizational capacity is easily reconstituted within a week or two, then yes, I could see us seeing stronger counterattacks later. I actually don't think that's likely, but I will need to write a longer piece on that, which I intend to do.
I do have some related data points that indirectly support my conclusion of a more-or-less total loss of military coherence in large weapons systems. (This implies nothing about small force ground fighting, of course, "cities still swallow armies").
a. Collapse of Air Defence. Total Air Supremacy in about 3 days. Deployment of non-stealth B-52 gravity bombers on or around day 4 demonstrates impunity.
b. Total destruction of all of the Iranian Navy's large vessels in about 4-5 days
c. Total nullification of Iranian anti-ship systems v. US strike groups (including Shaheed Drones and fast attack missile boats designed to swarm US carrier battle groups). If these are being simply held in reserve, then for what?
5. Noted with thanks. I look forward to reading about that. I rather liked the dictator's handbook and have cited it a few times. If it's built on foundations of academic sand, I'd rather know than not know. I was recently reading about the extent of the replication crisis in social sciences, and it seems we all need to go back and update many prior assumptions on many topics at this point. It seems the volume of non-replicable studies may indeed be north of 50%, which is somewhat disorienting for people who built worldviews on the acceptance of these studies.
Professor Turchin, your analysis of the logistics and Asabiya is structurally brilliant. From a geopolitical perspective, I agree with every point.
However, you are assuming that the target of Operation Epic Fury is Tehran when in reality it's Washington.
You view the logistical exhaustion of PAC-3 Patriot missiles as a strategic miscalculation by the US. If we look closer at the procurement shift, it becomes clear that the exhaustion of legacy munitions is in fact a forced product deprecation. It is the forcing function required to pivot the Pentagon entirely onto the attritable, AI-driven drone swarms built by Anduril and controlled with Palantir.
Where Lockheed and Raytheon sold inventory, the new Tech Lords sell software subscriptions like Palantir's Gotham and Anduril's Lattice. A SaaS business model collapses without an active user base. In defense tech, this means you need a manageable forever-war. Total victory and total defeat both lead to customer churn. To maximize shareholder value and justify the recurring revenue of the AI kill-chain, the Lords are financially incentivized to keep the geopolitical temperature perpetually in the Red Zone.
Furthermore, you note that external attacks forge internal Asabiya and suppress internal divisions.
The American Regime knows this. Facing a catastrophic demographic and electoral rejection in the upcoming November 2026 Midterms, the ruling coalition requires a State of Exception to justify the suspension of domestic norms, the deployment of internal security forces, and the activation of the FASAB 56 Black Budget.
I think you assume too much intelligence for Trump regime. In reality we have a fight between three obsessively messianic kleptocratic gangs of which the one ruling the US is the dumbest and the most corrupt. Even if they are dreaming of drone swarms sufficient for taking over from missiles (which might not be possible at all), they clearly aren't going to have them by March 23 (I've seen even earlier estimates for when the missiles will run out). Their only hope is to take out all Iranian launch capacity before that date. It makes no sense for Iran to keep missiles in storage and risk losing them, so I'd expect them to launch everything they have in the first few days. But, of course, they can also be expected to be too dumb to behave rationally - otherwise they wouldn't be in this situation in the first place.
Vladimir, this is not a "Trump regime". This is a Peter Thiel regime. Trump is just a second-rate TV show host acting as the face of the operation and distracting the masses from the men behind the curtain. The real controls have been captured by the Authoritarian Stack the moment cabinet appointments were announced.
Thiel, Miller, Hegseth, Icahn, Vought, Musk, Kennedy - all of them are even dumber than Trump, but more deranged and fanatical. They are the messianic gang I am talking about. Have you seen the recent news about Hegseth pushing Fundamentalist Evangelical propaganda in the military? Trump at least has good survival instinct. But you have to be a very special kind of stupid to be a billionaire and try to intentionally destroy the very country you are exploiting.
And if you need a personal name for this regime and don't like "Trump regime", I'd call it Putin regime. Being a Russia fan is clearly a pre-requisite for getting a cabinet position, and mimicking all things Putin is the fashion. They are essentially calling the war with Iran a "Special Military Operation" already.
Vladimir, you are making the classic error of looking at the Marketing Department and assuming they run the Engineering Department.
You see Hegseth pushing Evangelical propaganda and assume the Regime is a Christian fundamentalist cult. Look at the architecture, not the aesthetic. Humans require ideological software to function in a high-friction environment. While the Tech Lords wait for Anduril’s autonomous swarms and Hadrian's automated factories to fully scale, they still need bio-troops who will follow orders without question. Christian Nationalism is simply the most efficient compliance algorithm available for the current demographic of the enlisted class. Thiel and Musk are not Evangelicals; they are Transhumanists temporarily leasing an Evangelical militia.
As for your assertion that they are "destroying the country they exploit," you misunderstand their objective function. They do not view the United States as a nation to be governed but as a distressed asset to be liquidated. They are stripping the copper wire out of the Old Republic to build the data centers and orbital grids of the New Empire.
Finally, the fact that this mirrors Putin is not cosplay or fandom. It is Convergent Evolution. When a ruling class needs to bypass the legislature, secure emergency off-book funding (FASAB 56), and silence domestic opposition (NSPM-7), the physics of authoritarianism dictate they use the exact same legal and semantic loopholes. They are trying to do in 2 years what took Putin 20. Instrumental convergence is imminent.
I think you are making the classic error of assuming that there is a brain behind the chaos. There is not. I am not saying the ruling gang is all made of Christian Nationalists. It's fairly diverse and each one has his own brain worms. I think racism is the only thing they all share and even that is mostly a coincidence. And they are not destroying the US to build something better - they are just trying to make a quick buck while they can.
Yes, you are correct that they all share Putin's goals of replacing free market with crony capitalism and democracy with feudal kleptocracy. But their extreme loyalty to Russia at any cost can't be explained just by that.
It's only natural that you don't believe me. Some of these things are genuinely hard to believe. Instead of trying to persuade you, I will just say this: Read the Epstein files. Not the news reports about them; not citations; not screenshots; the actual files. Pay special attention to the files that mention Palantir, Martin Nowak, and Cantor Fitzgerald. These people are way smarter than you think.
lol jfc
Back at you, comrade.
I too have followed the "dissident American security experts" during the Ukraine war, when they forecasted an imminent defeat of Ukraine for the last three years.
I found their arguments convincing.
Nevertheless, by now I have to admit that they have been wrong. Not only is Ukraine not defeated, it seems to be moving forward recently.
Given this track record, I will no longer heed the arguments of said dissident American security experts.
I cannot help but be impressed by the USA/Israel alliance's ability to decapitate the regime so quickly and so spectacularly. So far this war has been well planned. If I had to bet, I'd put my money on USA/Israel.
You are entitled to your opinion, but they (at least the three I mentioned) haven't been saying "imminent" (in the sense, next month), but "inevitable". And I tend to agree with them. Ukraine is not moving forward, there are just minor back and forth fluctuations (and a lot of hype). We wait and see.
I have listened to him since the beginning of the Ukraine war. Since 2023, he has been saying that Ukraine has already been defeated. For example, in this https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMUAaWK79Vc, he and Carlson agreed that it was 'already over' for Ukraine 2.5 years ago.
Go through his podcasts over the years (using summaries), and you will find that in his mind Russia should be in Kiev at least since 2024.
Yes, a war can last a long time even if it is already lost, but in my opinion, too much time has passed for his forecasts to be correct. By now, there is no clear evidence to show that Ukraine is even losing.
I am grateful for his comments since they provide an alternative perspective, but I am now convinced that he is very one-sided—just as Carlson, Ritter etc. are. They have their fixed opinions (Ukraine bad, Israel very bad, Putin good, and now Trump also bad) and frame everything to fit that narrative.
I still listen to him from time to time, but am mindful that he is talking propaganda, just as we can hear from the other side.
How to solve your country's elite overproduction crisis in one easy step:
Trick Israel into assassinating your surplus elites
The question of asabiya in Iran is interesting.
I don't think Iran's enemies understand that the concept of martyrdom in the cause of justice is baked into Shi'ah Islam, which the Safavids established in Iran 500 years ago.
So the assumption that decapitating the regime undermines asabiya simply does not apply there.
I am not saying whether this is good or bad – simply pointing it out.
Regards,
Trevor
Yes, I also here from several credible sources that martyrdom and suffering is a characteristic Shia find admirable. But it's a more general proposal -- you put any group of people under a press long enough, and they will develop asabiya. A literary example is the Fremen in Dune. And the Sardaukar.
Hi Peter,
Does that apply to Ukraine?
When the full-sclae invasion took place, I recall you expected asabiya to be equal on both sides. Do you still stand by that?
Regards,
Trevor
This conflict is very much like a civil war between very similar peoples. So yes, asabiya should be about the same on both sides.
Yes, killing the leaders might indeed improve asabiya, especially in the Shiia strong martyrdom tradition.
But, on the other hand, it's also a way of making attrition very personal, because it means killing them one by one until one of them doesn't want to die and agrees to negotiate and/or surrender.
We'll see which logic prevails.
There is more to war than logistics. The US has outperforming the Iranians at the operational level.
Surprisingly, Trump actually listened to General Caine and delayed the attack until the US had moved more forces into the region(USS Gerald Ford) to both launch attacks and defend bases. And the US has decades of experience in fighting modern wars.
The Iranians seem to be attacking a pre-designated list of targets without regards the principle of concentration of force. In the Ukraine, both sides conduct focused barrages to overwhelm air defenses, but the Iranians have scattered their attacks doing little damage. They even pointlessly attacked the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, which was not even be used.
The Iranians also neglected basic operational security. Putin rarely meets with anyone in person and has identical offices so you can't figure out where he is. Saddam Hussein used to sleep at a different location every night. Instead the Iranians scheduled a mass in-person meeting of all their top people.
Logistical limitations will eventually slow the US attacks but new ordnance is made continously. Iranian missile and drone manufacturing facilities are vulnerable to US attack and they have no outside source of supply (the Russians were buying from them).
The US problem is that winning operationally does not change the fundamental situation. The current regime will remain in control and will continue to cause problems.
I initially was going to disagree with you, but in the end you've argued yourself to my side. But the important point is that in the final analysis, logistics trumps operations.
Sometimes, operations trumps logistics. Remember France in 1940. If you are conquered, your opponents logistics problems become irrelevant.
However, there is a logic to US policy here. It seeks to deal with a hostile state through active deterence, damaging its military capabilities without conquest.
This is something new. In the 20th century, air attacks usually involved flying planes over enemy territory and bombing the enemy. However, missiles and drones have largely replaced bombs, so warfare can be conducted at a distance. If your opponent lacks similar capabilities, you can attack with impunity. The Iranians had some capability to fight at a distance, but they wasted it with poor planning.
Using your military to harm but not conquer is reminiscint of ancient empires. The Romans found Germania to hard and unprobitable to conquer, but they conducted punitive expeditions against hostile tribes. Similar behaviour occured with other empires.
Another precedent were efforts to deal with the Barbary pirates through retaliation. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Barbary_War). These failed because the pirates were semi-independent actors whose livelihood depended on piracy and were willing to ignore the damage inflicted. Piracy was only stopped by conquest.
It remains to be seen whether damage without conquest will be a successful doctrine.
Your example of the Roman frontier with Germania is quite appropriate. I discuss it at length in War and Peace and War. And what was the outcome? The Germans conquered the western parts of the Roman empire. A lesson here for the American empire, n'est-ce pas?
Has the United States military repeatedly split into factions each seeking to put their leader into the Presidency? That is what the Romans did.
The primary conflict Iran is heading into will not be about the West; it will be purely internal, as has happened before in Iranian history. This will be a struggle between those who support a theocratic state and those who want a secular country.
Yes, ultimately it's the question of asabiya.
🎯Decapitation and Fragmentation Strategy🎯
In Russia, as well as in other countries, some experts predict that since the US failed to topple the regime in two days, they have now ended up with their own "Ukraine," and this war is here to stay.
This is a rather naive outlook on the part of these experts—a failure to understand that no two wars are the same and that this war will not be like the one in Ukraine.
First, Iran is not a massive Russia. Most importantly, it stands alone and is now closed off; it is surrounded mostly by enemies or those who are indifferent but under US control. It lacks a massive rear like Ukraine has in the West, as well as a shared OPEN BORDER with such a rear. This means that even if China, for example, wanted to become that rear for Iran, it would find it very, very difficult to establish a major supply channel for equipment and ammunition.
Second, the people in Iran did not unite after the war began. Unlike in Ukraine, the local authorities, who have been in power for decades, have managed to alienate a very large portion of the citizenry. A majority of Iranians are currently rooting for the US military rather than the Iranian army.
Third, this is a completely different war strategy with different goals because the internal situation in Iran differs greatly from that in Ukraine. There is no objective here to shift into a war of attrition to reprogram the Iranian people through it; almost everyone who could be reprogrammed there has been already, and for that, we can thank the theistic government in Iran itself.
Therefore, different methods of warfare will be employed—specifically, a focus on the constant elimination of the top leadership.
Then there is all this talk about how the Iranian leadership defragmented its power precisely so that everything would not depend on just one or two people at the top, turning it into autonomous cells that make decisions on their own. This is, of course, a good and successful strategy that guarantees the regime will still put up resistance even after a leader dies.
However, the problem with this strategy is that it cannot exist successfully for long in the long run without the fragmentation of the country itself.
Autonomous cells are good for guerrilla warfare or a terrorist underground, but they cannot manage a state, an economy, or a complex air defense system.
In other words, these intentionally fragmented parts will, over time—and quite quickly—stop acting as a single entity, which is perfectly natural for such a structure in this situation.
This planned and temporary strategy of power fragmentation is successful in a very short war, because afterward, the real fragmentation of power and the country begins, and these fragmented pieces stop fighting as a unified whole.
As soon as the central vertical disappears, "autonomous commanders" turn into warlords. They begin to compete for resources, which leads to feudalization and the collapse of the country from within, rather than to organized resistance against an aggressor.
If the Russians in Ukraine had adhered to the same strategy that the Americans are building now, the war would have been completely different. After all, the Kremlin has real means to eliminate the top leadership in Ukraine.
If, for example, they had eliminated Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi back in the day, who would have taken power in Ukraine? Poroshenko or perhaps Budanov? But they would not have had such a rating or such support, and this would have directly affected the stability of the vertical of power and the execution of decisions throughout its length. And then, if the new top leadership in the form of the new government—say, that same Poroshenko—were eliminated, power would pass to an even less popular person, further breaking the vertical of power and fragmenting it along with the country. And so on—again, the elimination of the top leadership and the arrival of even more unpopular people, meaning even greater destruction of central power and fragmentation of the country, and then its collapse as a unified state.
This is exactly how the US and Israel will act now: as soon as Iran chooses a new leader—and it must choose one, as their fragmented power management cannot function successfully as a single entity for long. Furthermore, Iran cannot do this in secret; a leader must be presented to the country, and everyone must know who the new leader is. And as soon as they announce a new leader, they are essentially drawing a cross on his forehead; the hunt for him will begin immediately. Given the military and technological capabilities of the US and Israel, and the fact that most of the Iranian people are rooting against their own government, the chances of a new leader staying alive for long after his election are very slim.
To become the new leader of Iran now is, in essence, to sign your own death warrant. The moment you become the leader—that’s it; the hunt is immediately on for you, and you become the number one target in a hunt where the hunters have vast capabilities.
So Iran will not be able, like Ukraine, to provide resistance for years centrally and through a strong vertical of all power.
In Iran, because of a different strategic vision of the war, the US and Israel will help the Iranian government fragment so quickly (compared to the war in Ukraine) that it will no longer be able to resist as a single entity, and the conflict will begin to shift more into an internal and smoldering one.
The big war will be over, and the central power will fall, but there will be no peace in Iran; the Iranians themselves will still have to fight internally to finally destroy the theistic power on the ground and become a peaceful and unified secular society again.
So for Trump, the main thing is to say that the primary goal is simply the fall of the regime, and after that, the Iranians will fight within the country themselves for a peaceful and prosperous secular society. Then he will secure a victory and not fall into the trap of a long conflict that won't be resolved by a quick transition of Iran to a new, peaceful secular life.
Yes. I tend to agree with the essence of your analysis here.
Most "experts" underestimate the impact of technology updates over the past decades, including recent AI and sensor updates, on the US military's operational tempo.
Operational Tempo drives faster kill chains.
Faster Kills chains drive a new kind of decapitation / C2 disruption warfare that we have never seen before.
Simply repeating "air wars don't work" blinds us to the nuances of this situation.
Indeed, what we are seeing is the very essence of OODA-loop and tempo-driven warfare doctrine.
Professor Turchin's assabiya point is well taken, but by his own admission, this takes time, and the US might be able to eliminate new leaders faster than new assabiya can be built and operationalized.
This, of course, does not solve "the problem" of a theocratic Iran, but it does open a window for a greater range of potential outcomes. Which is a net positive in a world where all the default outcomes are bad.
This all reminds me of the Gingko leaf analogy we've seen used before (e.g., Hoyer, Turchin et al 2025). There are points at which too many forces are in play and reliable "patterns of history" lose their predictive power. Many outcomes are possible.
US can do war like this bc they have strong power due to strong asabiya no? But US is in disintegrative phase no? Why the US, Israel or world financial elites r doing war? Like why do they need war. To make inner social unstability pressure go out? In social demographic and elite class point of view.
US is in the disintegrative phase but it still has more Asabiya than other nations of its size.
Geopolitics is a constant regardless of the phase of the secular cycle. For Israel, the war is existential as Iran has commanded and supplied its frontier enemies. For the US, the war is primarily geopolitical. It's possible the US elite, primarily Trump, also have personal motivations, but those are secondary.
Thanks for ur reply! I checked two geopolitics substack in here. So it's Steppe Empire VS. Atlanticist Plutocrats
Hi Peter,
Very interesting as always. My two cents: at this stage, I wouldn’t rule out any outcome: it’s still too early to make firm predictions. That said, I wouldn’t exclude the possibility of a partial regime change either. The Iranian elites appear quite fragmented, state legitimacy seems significantly lower than in previous years, and revolts and protests have become both more frequent and more intense, with repression growing correspondingly harsher.
Iran’s population has tripled since the 1970s, while living conditions have generally deteriorated. Youth unemployment has soared to around 50–60% in some areas, with more than 40% of the unemployed holding at least a university degree. Under these conditions, it seems plausible that the religious clergy could eventually be displaced by a military elite — perhaps from the Pasdaran?— which has been somewhat sidelined in recent years. One could imagine a scenario loosely comparable to what happened in Syria with al-Jolani, a former al-Qaeda combatant who rebranded himself as a more moderate and cohesive leader.
I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts on this.
Asabiya is not necessarily a problem for the US or Israel. Neither country is Iran's natural enemy. Israel saw it as an ally from 1948 to 1979. A pro-west regime would confer a significant survival advantage, and can be developed a lot faster than asabiya.
Fascinating analysis, as always. I'm surprised, however, to see no mention of Iran's water crisis brought on by both bad management but also to no small extent, population growth. Isn't structural demographics relevant here? The scenario is similar to what preceded Syria's implosion (I haven't mentioned the role of climate warming). Also, isn't Iraq a parallel experience in terms of American intervention and asabiya? How has that turned out? I haven't heard anything much in the news about the political situation there for ages, only that it, too has a population growth and water shortage problem.
When I first read your idea of new Empires arising on meta ethnic fault lines, my first thought was the Kurds.
I think Peter Turchin is right, targeted assassinations of leaders is a selection pressure for tougher and more violent leaders.
I am hunting, and hunting in vain for a historical example where assassinating the boss made his successor keen to reach a peaceful deal with the guys who killed him.
Knock off a Julius Caesar and get a Caesar Augustus.
Knock off a Marat and get a Robespierre.
But I can't find either an exemple where leaders were deliberately and efficiently targeted in such a way by a foreign power. With the possible exception of the legendary Hashashin order during the Crusades.
During WW2, the Americans killed Yamamoto but that's about it. And none of the "big boss" were deliberately targeted and/or killed (except by their own people).
[REPEAT FROM JANUARY 2026]
// ⛔The sharp fall of a theocracy is rarely painless.⛔
Although I have always rooted for changing the regime in Iran, and now the situation seems good for this, it is already too late for Trump to do this now and help the rebels militarily. This should have been done immediately after the elections, back when Iran was being bombed; that's when the people should have been raised and helped.
But doing it now is much more dangerous - precisely because of democracy and constant elections. Because of this, the president cannot conduct a truly normal foreign, or even domestic policy, because the elections tie his hands, planning horizon, and capabilities. Yet often, unpopular decisions have to be made in order to then get good and useful results.
But because of constant elections, it is extremely difficult for presidents to take unpopular steps - even when they are really needed and will bring many benefits in the future. Electoral cycles are too short for big and historical affairs. The voter feels the negative from unpopular decisions immediately, while the positive often comes after the next electoral cycle.
And that is exactly the situation with Iran now. If Trump starts an Iranian operation, the voter will definitely see the negative. But whether all this will end positively before the midterms this year is a big question. Iran is still not Venezuela. There are few chances that everything can be finished quickly and relatively bloodlessly there. And primarily because in Venezuela the elites, by and large, did not have an idea - there were only interests and money.
But in Iran there is an idea. And not just an idea, but a religious idea, which also promises life after death. This gives people much more courage and readiness for sacrifice. Even if, let's say, the Americans destroy the top of the Iranian regime with a missile, does this guarantee that the protesters will quickly take power? No, not at all. And precisely because of religion.
In a religious society with a great ancient history, where faith was imposed for decades and accompanied by prohibitions, and all this happened already in the era of the internet, naturally a youth formed that is tired of religion and thirsting for freedom. That is, this is a struggle not only for political freedom, but also, in essence, for greater religious freedom, and for some - also for atheistic freedom. That is precisely why during the current protests the rebels are burning mosques (as a symbol of the theocratic regime) and seminaries (spiritual schools).
This is not only a political struggle, but also a religious one. And in a religious war, resistance is always much higher. In Iran, in addition to the protesters, there are many sincerely believing people who are not ready voluntarily and with joy to move from a theocratic state to a secular one. There are many such people - at all levels and in all spheres. And many of them will not accept a secular state without resistance.
History shows that the transition from a theocratic regime to a secular one, especially a quick and revolutionary one, most often ends in a civil war. But in the transition from a secular state to a religious one, the chances of getting by with little blood are greater - non-believers do not offer such fierce resistance as believers. They usually come to active struggle only after long years of religious oppression and fatigue from it.
So even in the case of overthrowing or physically destroying the top of the regime, Iran will with a high degree of probability still have to go through a civil conflict to change the theocracy to a secular state and for society to accept this. Therefore, there are extremely few chances that before the elections Trump will be able to boast of a major success in Iran to voters if he goes in there now. This is the real downside of frequent elections - when the president already after a year is forced to be afraid to make necessary but unpopular decisions.
Regime change in Iran is a necessary thing, even very necessary. But it is unpopular, including among Trump's voters. They, like the rest, will not understand if all this does not end in a quick victory, as in Venezuela, and America again finds itself dragged into a prolonged conflict in the Middle East. Shances to quickly and with little blood conduct the transition from theocratic Iran to secular are extremely few.
Is Iran worth risking the elections? The choice is disproportionate. On one side of the scale is the fate of Iran, on the other is the fate of the whole world. Because Trump changes not only America, he changes the world order. Now it makes more sense to take Greenland - it will be quick and with minimal risk of blood, than to stake everything because of Iran.
Yes, Trump has shown that he is a very lucky person, and largely because of this he is where he is now. But is it worth taking such a risk in an election year when everything is at stake - the future not only of America, but of the whole world? //
I agree that selection pressure should in theory produce high Assabiya leadership. I don’t think that this automatically invalidates US decapitation strategy for the following reasons:
1. The more layers of leadership you remove, the more the future leaders are likely to NOT resemble the current leadership. From the US perspective they are looking for pragmatic leaders they can (at a minimum) do “deals with” and maximally “bring Iran back into the fold of US allies in the Gulf”. You probably have to peel back many layers of the onion before you get there because the existing regime is primarily motivated by theocratic concerns, not practical ones. In a truly ideal world, so much of the theocratic regime is destroyed that the future leadership is drawn from current dissident ranks inside Iran with radically different interests than the current regime. Return of the Shah’s son would be a mistake IMHO.
2. As you note, it might take decades for high Assabiya leadership groups to emerge. The more that process begins with people not in serious power today, the more we are likely to avoid a repeat of the previous two Ayatollahs.
3. On a tactical horizon, eliminating command and control nodes is military doctrine because it is a highly effective way to shorten wars and prevent coherent military responses from enemies. Since day 1 of the campaign the Iranian launch rate has reduced by 88%. This is unprecedented in the history of warfare. It no doubt has many causes, but a leadership layer that is either gone, or (what’s left of it) is unable to speak to other nodes is certainly a major factor: it prevents coordinated, coherent military responses. This reduces the military risks for the US and regional partners and reduces the costs and depletion rates of Patriot / THAAD interceptors, which are the weakest link in terms of being able to politically sustain the campaign. To the extent that all wars are a combination of military and political goals, the military goal is usually defined along the lines of “getting the other military to accept that further resistance is futile”. Trump’s statement to IRGC that if they stop fighting there will be a general clemency was deliberately designed to achieve this in combination with décapitation strikes on senior leaders who would never accept this. As IRGC rank and file are also quite fanatical, it might not work, but it’s not a terrible strategy to at least try (in combination with other approaches for achieving that result). The more total your military victory, the wider your options for effective post war settlement (this is why WW2 HAD to go all the way to Berlin; they learned their lesson from WW1).
4. We already have one extremely high Assabiya group in the region, the Kurds. They are going to seek to carve an autonomous region for themselves and (if they can) a State for themselves. Turkey will try to prevent this of course, so this one is complex, but at a minimum, it gives the US more options for achieving more interesting regime modification options than a simple “swap” of one Ayatollah for another.
5. As noted in “The Dictators’ Handbook” the dictator has a small group of very loyal followers while the democratic leader tends to need to bring more people “along for the ride”. This makes dictatorships extremely stable, but at the cost of very high numbers of internal enemies who must be suppressed at all times for regime survival. (See #4 above, plus the Baluchis, Sunnis etc.) If the inner “hard core” of regime loyalists can be sufficiently weakened by sustained décapitation efforts and peripheral actions by ethnic minorities, then a totally new group can potentially take power in Tehran. Tehran itself is extremely non-theocratic in its orientation and is full of angry young people.
This was seen with (incredibly!) rapid re-integration of Germany into the European Democratic and Economic system after 1945. The “hard core” of true believers was extremely determined but ultimately a minority that could be replaced by other groups within German society rather quickly. “Minor” nazis were rather easily re-assimilated into a system compatible with US postwar goals.
This can yet end with the US achieving many of its objectives, either minimally or maximally.
A few responses:
1. It's more likely that the future leaders will not be moderate -- they are likely to be young and hate America.
3. It's too early to tell whether Iranians are running out of missiles (or launchers), or whether it's a tactical move. We wait and see.
5. Eventually I am going to write a devastating critique of the Dictators' Handbook. It's wrong at all levels.
Thanks, Peter. Appreciate the dialogue as always.
1. I see your point, but I still think this one is hard to read. Unless the cheering at the death of Khamenei in Tehran was fabricated, it seems that many people in Tehran hated their own leaders more than they hate America. That said, if everyone in any kind of leadership position (even junior) is a committed Shi'a theocrat who hates America, then yes, your assumption of another round of younger fanatical clerics tracks. The only alternative outcome I see is if the Iranian people remove anyone with ties to the current regime, and we get a full (counter) revolutionary regime change. I have no idea whether this is possible. It does seem unlikely right now, so you're probably right on this one. This one is very hard to read from the outside. I have no visibility into the inner workings of Iranian society to predict this.
3. I should clarify: I'm not claiming that Iran has run out of missiles. They almost certainly have not. The most likely conclusion I reach is that they have lost the ability to coordinate their people and systems effectively to select targets, transmit orders, and mount an effective counter-offensive campaign. This looks like an organizational collapse, not a total loss of materiel. There is little doubt that many missiles are hidden away in various places. If this organizational capacity is easily reconstituted within a week or two, then yes, I could see us seeing stronger counterattacks later. I actually don't think that's likely, but I will need to write a longer piece on that, which I intend to do.
I do have some related data points that indirectly support my conclusion of a more-or-less total loss of military coherence in large weapons systems. (This implies nothing about small force ground fighting, of course, "cities still swallow armies").
a. Collapse of Air Defence. Total Air Supremacy in about 3 days. Deployment of non-stealth B-52 gravity bombers on or around day 4 demonstrates impunity.
b. Total destruction of all of the Iranian Navy's large vessels in about 4-5 days
c. Total nullification of Iranian anti-ship systems v. US strike groups (including Shaheed Drones and fast attack missile boats designed to swarm US carrier battle groups). If these are being simply held in reserve, then for what?
5. Noted with thanks. I look forward to reading about that. I rather liked the dictator's handbook and have cited it a few times. If it's built on foundations of academic sand, I'd rather know than not know. I was recently reading about the extent of the replication crisis in social sciences, and it seems we all need to go back and update many prior assumptions on many topics at this point. It seems the volume of non-replicable studies may indeed be north of 50%, which is somewhat disorienting for people who built worldviews on the acceptance of these studies.
My comments https://jayrtaylor.substack.com/p/now-who-is-the-biggest-sponsor-of