From a cliodynamic perspective, you have often argued that the US is in a phase of structural disintegration driven by elite overproduction and rising inequality, and that Europe is likely heading toward political fragmentation rather than integrative imperiogenesis.
How would you situate Russia in this same framework today? Where is Russia in the structural-demographic cycle compared to the US and Europe?
Preliminary analysis suggests that Russia is at the beginning of the next integrative cycle. My research group is gathering the data and I will be able to firm up this estimate before the end of 2026.
It seems to me a reasonable conjecture to say that the technological changes and the increasing wealth of societies in general have imposed a long term rise in the costs of conquest. And the slow rise of empire I strongly suspect was always driven by a repeated profit to the rulers of the rising empire (rarely the population as a whole. (Well, absent the periods when the triumph of an empire tended to leave wars within the empire profitless even for so-called elites.) Indeed the tempo of significant historical changes appears to be much faster precisely because of the greater possibilities opened by economic growth on a scale and depth vastly greater than the period when empires accreted over the centuries. It's not clear to me at this point today's states can survive a single century.
Possibly a trivial point but is it so obvious that a strong Kievan Rus would have conquered the Mongols when the Poles and Hungarians didn't? Or that the Mamelukes were so much less decayed?
You seem to be doing your own cherry-picking, Peter. As you say " expansion is a slow and methodical business that proceeds despite occasional setbacks" but you could easily the same of contraction. The Ottoman Empire did not collapse in a day and won occasional victories during its decline. The British Empire collapsed in a generation after a great victory.
The most notable historical trend here is that wars of conquest have generally fared poorly in the post-WW2 period. The failures have been numerous (Afghanistan, Kuwait, South Korea) while the successes generally involved minor places (Goa, Rio de Oro) or created continuing problems for the conquerers (Palestine).
The reason is both technological (improved weapons make attackers more vulnerable as they must leave cover to take ground) and political as the international community supports the victims and does not recognize the legitimacy of the conquest. Wars of conquest are also expensive and the economic gains minimal.
With regards to WW2, it is important to consider the failures of Nazi Germany. For example, look at aircraft production, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_aircraft_production. In the key year of 1942, the British outproduced the Germans and nearly matched the Russians.
Hmm, you didn't establish that I am doing cherry-picking. I don't even talk about the post 1945 period, because "it is too early to tell" how it will play out. And, as far as the post-1945 period is concerned, you seem to be forgetting the successful annexation of East Germany by West Germany.
What? “The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the Revolution of 1905-07 was followed by the Stolypin reform and a period of rapid industrialization and economic growth, which unfortunately was cut short by World War I.” No. The Soviet revolution exited the country from the Great World. It was cut short by the Russian Revolution, not World War I.
Very interesting stuff, Peter!
From a cliodynamic perspective, you have often argued that the US is in a phase of structural disintegration driven by elite overproduction and rising inequality, and that Europe is likely heading toward political fragmentation rather than integrative imperiogenesis.
How would you situate Russia in this same framework today? Where is Russia in the structural-demographic cycle compared to the US and Europe?
Preliminary analysis suggests that Russia is at the beginning of the next integrative cycle. My research group is gathering the data and I will be able to firm up this estimate before the end of 2026.
It seems to me a reasonable conjecture to say that the technological changes and the increasing wealth of societies in general have imposed a long term rise in the costs of conquest. And the slow rise of empire I strongly suspect was always driven by a repeated profit to the rulers of the rising empire (rarely the population as a whole. (Well, absent the periods when the triumph of an empire tended to leave wars within the empire profitless even for so-called elites.) Indeed the tempo of significant historical changes appears to be much faster precisely because of the greater possibilities opened by economic growth on a scale and depth vastly greater than the period when empires accreted over the centuries. It's not clear to me at this point today's states can survive a single century.
Possibly a trivial point but is it so obvious that a strong Kievan Rus would have conquered the Mongols when the Poles and Hungarians didn't? Or that the Mamelukes were so much less decayed?
You seem to be doing your own cherry-picking, Peter. As you say " expansion is a slow and methodical business that proceeds despite occasional setbacks" but you could easily the same of contraction. The Ottoman Empire did not collapse in a day and won occasional victories during its decline. The British Empire collapsed in a generation after a great victory.
The most notable historical trend here is that wars of conquest have generally fared poorly in the post-WW2 period. The failures have been numerous (Afghanistan, Kuwait, South Korea) while the successes generally involved minor places (Goa, Rio de Oro) or created continuing problems for the conquerers (Palestine).
The reason is both technological (improved weapons make attackers more vulnerable as they must leave cover to take ground) and political as the international community supports the victims and does not recognize the legitimacy of the conquest. Wars of conquest are also expensive and the economic gains minimal.
With regards to WW2, it is important to consider the failures of Nazi Germany. For example, look at aircraft production, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_aircraft_production. In the key year of 1942, the British outproduced the Germans and nearly matched the Russians.
Hmm, you didn't establish that I am doing cherry-picking. I don't even talk about the post 1945 period, because "it is too early to tell" how it will play out. And, as far as the post-1945 period is concerned, you seem to be forgetting the successful annexation of East Germany by West Germany.
Lol - the international community.
We see you.
What? “The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the Revolution of 1905-07 was followed by the Stolypin reform and a period of rapid industrialization and economic growth, which unfortunately was cut short by World War I.” No. The Soviet revolution exited the country from the Great World. It was cut short by the Russian Revolution, not World War I.
The Soviets reversed the Stolypin reforms.